Conflict and Development Analysis of the Bangsamoro

Conservative estimates of deaths due to the wars in Mindanao cite nearly 120,000 casualties from 1970-1996, with even higher figures of and cyclical displacement. Purely economic assessment of the costs of conflict range from a conservative figure of around US$2 to 3 billion for the period of 170 to 2001 to a higher estimate of around US$10 billion for the period 1975 to 2002. THe latter considered not only direct output losses but also other factors such as foregone investments, and capital fight. If the latter costs is used, at the 2005 average exchange rate of P54.5 to the US dollar, this amounts to P545 billion, or around P20 billion per year - losses that have translated into profound social and economic impacts for both the Bangsamoro and the Philippine as a whole.

As a regional development plan for a conflict - affected area, the BDP is anchored on an understanding of the complex security, justice, and economic drivers that perpetuate conflict and its corresponding development costs. The 2005 Joints Needs Assessment (JNA) for Reconstruction and Development and Conflict - Affected Area in Mindanao illustrates how injustice in its various manifestation underpins the historical conflict in the Bangsamoro. These forms on injustice in turn escalate into armed confrontation due to key triggers, including competition for scarce natural and mineral resource, crime (e.g. cattle rustling, kidnapping), local election disputes, or policies such as the declaration of "all-out-war" against the MILF by Estrada administration, among others.

In respond to the cycles of violence and insecurity driven by widespread economic marginalization and political disenfranchisement in the Bangsamoro, the CAB, specifically the tripoli Agreement of 2001, commits the parties to three interlocking aspects of the process: a) the security and normalization track, b) the political track, and c) the socio-economic track, including its humanitarian, rehabilitation and development components. While much work remains to be done in support of structural and security sector reform, particularly in the transition years, the full implementation of the CAB will acquire targeted socio-economic response that will enable the Bangsamoro to immediately feel the benefits of the peace dividends and improve their overall welfare.

The signing of the CAB is a significant step in reducing incidences of state-minority contestation, or vertical conflict, which pits non-state armed groups against government forces. Data from the GPH Coordinating committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), shown in figure 1, show that no armed skirmishes between the GPH and MILF occurred since the breakthrough in peace negotiations in 2012, providing an enabling environment for stable communities and continues socio-economic delivery.

courtesy: Edgardo Barandiaran (Economic Costs of the Mindanao Conflict)